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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SHELTER AMERICA CORPORATION,
a Colorado corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 860104
vs .
OHIO CASUALTY & INSURANCE
COMPANY, an Ohio corporation,
Defendant-Cross-Appellant/
Respondent.
REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
POINT I
OHIO CASUALTY DID NOT VOLUNTEER TO INDEMNIFY
AGAINST ANY FRAUD, ONLY FRAUD INVOLVING
MOTOR VEHICLES
Shelter America has advanced the absurd proposition that
the motor vehicle dealer's bond covers any fraud committed by
Dewey & Bob's.

Shelter America suggests that the meaning of

"motor vehicle" is therefore irrelevant.

According to this

logic, if Dewey & Bob's had fraudulently sold real estate or
issued fraudulent checks, the loss would be covered.

Ohio

Casualty supposedly volunteered to provide such coverage.
To support this argument, Shelter America omits part of the
controlling clause, disregards the remainder of the controlling

sentence and ignores the entire context of the bond.

Even

strict construction against the surety does not require the
bond to be rewritten to give it a meaning that was plainly not
intended.

When the bond is viewed as a whole, the only

rational interpretation is that the bond only covers fraud
involving motor vehicles.
Rather than quoting the precise language of the bond,
Shelter America rephrases that language to suit its argument.
On page 4 of Respondent's Brief, Shelter America contends that
the bond covers "any loss suffered by reason of fraud or fraudulent representation."

This is not what the bond says.

The

bond says that there is indemnification for "any loss suffered
by reason of the fraud or fraudulent representations made." The
words deleted by Shelter America give the clause a different
meaning.

These words connect the clause to the rest of the

sentence by referring to the fraud, not just any fraud.
When the entire clause is put in the context of the
remainder of the sentence, it becomes clear that the fraud
referred to is fraud involving motor vehicles.

The sentence

requires the principal to conduct his business as a motor
vehicle dealer in compliance with the Motor Vehicle Business
Act.

The statute required that Ohio Casualty specifically

mention fraud or fraudulent representation in its bond.
Utah Code Ann. § 40-3-16 (1981).
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See

The remainder of the bond

also confirms that the fraud referred to is fraud involving
motor vehicles.

The title of the bond is "Bond of Motor

Vehicle Dealer or Salesman" and the preamble to the bond is
that the principal has applied for a license to do business as
a motor vehicle dealer.
To give the bond the meaning argued for by Shelter America
is to disregard the context in which fraud is mentioned.
is contrary to the rules of contract interpretation.

This

See Utah

Valley Bank v. Tanner, 626 P.2d 1060, 1061-62 (Utah 1981).

The

interpretation advanced by Shelter America also requires an
actual deletion of some of the language of the bond.

Strict

construction against the surety aside, the principles of contract interpretation require that all words of a contract be
given some meaning.

Presumably the drafter did not include

words which were intended to be ignored.
The language of the bond simply does not support Shelter
America's contention that Ohio Casualty volunteered to cover
any fraud.

Under all of the applicable rules of interpreta-

tion, Ohio Casualty's bond should be interpreted to cover the
fraud or fraudulent representations made by the principal in
his business as a motor vehicle dealer, but the bond should not
be interpreted to include all other kinds of fraud the principal may have committed.
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POINT II
THE PRIMARY INTENDED USE OF A MOBILE HOME IS
FOR RESIDENCE, NOT FOR TRAVEL ON THE PUBLIC
HIGHWAY
The parties agree that a mobile home does not fall within
the statutory definition of motor vehicle unless a mobile home
is "a vehicle intended primarily for operation on the public
highways."

Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-16.

Shelter America argues

that a mobile home satisfies this definition because it is
equipped with a trailer hitch, wheelbases and taillights and is
therefore intended to be drawn on the public highways by a
motor vehicle.

Ohio Casualty does not dispute that a mobile

home is designed to be drawn on the public highways; but, that
is not the test set forth by the statute.

The question is

whether that is the primary intended use.
The fallacy of Shelter America's argument is demonstrated
by its own reference to automobiles.

Shelter America submits

that many automobiles spend little time on the public highways
and might therefore not be considered intended primarily for
operation on the public highways.

Shelter America points out

that many automobiles spend a great deal of time simply parked
in garages.

Herein lies the fallacy.

When an automobile is

off the public highways it is not being used.

Hence, its pri-

mary use remains operation on the public highways.

By con-

trast, a mobile home is being used when it is parked.
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In fact

that is when it is being used most fully.

An automobile sits

cold and dark when not on the highways, whereas, a mobile home
is used by its residents as a shelter.
intended use of a mobile home.

Shelter is the primary

The mobile home is intended to

travel on the public highways, but only so that the mobile home
can be transported from one location to another.

This trans-

portation is not the primary use of a mobile home.
Thorp Finance Corp. v. Wright, 16 Utah 2d 267, 399 P.2d 206
(1965) demonstrates the proper analytic approach notwithstanding any difference between the mobile homes in this case and
the dwellings in Thorp-

Although the dwellings in Thorp may

have been somewhat more permanent in their design, design was
not the touchstone of the Court's decision.

The Court affirmed

the lower court's judgment for the following reason:
We think the trial court took the only reasonable and
realistic interpretive approach by saying that the
primary purpose of the movement of these units was not
to use our highways but to plant the units terra firma
wise to accommodate two small families, with two
separate entrances and facilities.
Id. at 207-08 (emphasis in the original).
here.

The same is true

The purpose of moving modern-day mobile homes is not to

use the highways, but to relocate the mobile homes for use as a
shelter in another location.

Shelter, not transportation,

remains the primary intended use of a mobile home.

For this

reason, this Court should conclude that the mobile homes are
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not "motor vehicles" as that term is defined in the Motor
Vehicle Business Act, Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-7(1) (1981).
This Court's decision in Consolidated Finance Corp. v.
Moulton, 25 Utah 2d 416, 483 P.2d 450 (1971), did not reach the
question now before the Court.

There the action against the

surety was dismissed because the plaintiff's claim was for
breach of contract, not for fraud.

This Court only assumed and

did not decide whether the house trailer involved in that case
was a motor vehicle.
POINT III
PUBLIC POLICY DOES NOT REQUIRE THIS COURT TO
MODIFY THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF MOTOR
VEHICLES TO INCLUDE MOBILE HOMES
Shelter America argues that even if mobile homes are not
technically within the definition of motor vehicles, this Court
should include them within that definition for public policy
reasons.

Such an amendment of the statute is not dictated by

public policy, nor is it an appropriate exercise of judicial
power.
Shelter America relies on the fact that two state agencies
have treated mobile home as motor vehicles; however, that is
not an appropriate public policy consideration.

In Thorp v.

Wright, supra, this Court rejected the very same argument.
There the plaintiff argued that the house trailers involved in
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that case should be treated as motor vehicles.

This Court

declined to give the Tax Commission's interpretation any
import.

Id.,

at 208.

By doing so, this Court put the Tax Com-

mission and other state agencies on notice that, contrary to
agency interpretation, house trailers do not fall within the
definition of motor vehicle.

Had those agencies or the

legislature itself wanted to change that definition to include
mobile homes, there were many opportunities to do so between
the 1965 decision in Thorp and 1977 when Ohio Casualty's bond
was issued.
In truth, the Utah Code treats mobile homes separately.
They are subject to the Mobile Homes and Recreational Vehicles
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-20-1 through 7 (1981).

That Act

requires mobile homes to be certified as in compliance with the
applicable plumbing, heating, electrical and fire prevention
standards.

Had the legislature chosen to make mobile home

sales subject to the protections against fraud, it could have
easily done so.

It is not the role of this Court to make the

determination for the legislature.
Shelter America further contends that it is unworkable for
this Court to ask state agencies as well as the public to make
a distinction between mobile homes and motor vehicles.
reality the difference is not all that difficult.

In

Most con-

sumers know whether they are shopping for something to transport them on the highways or for something to provide them with
-7-

shelter and a place to live.

Motor homes and recreational

vehicles might provide a closer call; however, these classifications have already been made by the Motor Vehicle Administration as is demonstrated by the various license classifications.

Further, if the state agencies did not change their

practice after this Court's decision in Thorp, there is no
reason to believe they will find it necessary to change their
practices if this Court affirms Thorp by concluding that
modern-day mobile homes are also not motor vehicles.
POINT IV
WHETHER THE MOBILE HOME FRAUD WAS SUFFICIENTLY RELATED TO DEWEY & BOB'S MOTOR
VEHICLE BUSINESS TO FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF
COVERAGE WAS NOT RAISED BELOW.
In Point I, Part C of Shelter America's Respondent's Brief,
Shelter America argues that its claim is sufficiently related
to Dewey & Bob's motor vehicle business to be covered even if
mobile homes are not motor vehicles.

As will be argued, Ohio

Casualty considers this argument to misconstrue Betenson v.
Call Auto & Equipment Sales, Inc., 645 P.2d 684 (1982); however, this argument should not even be considered by the court
because it was not raised in the lower court.
Below Shelter America opposed Ohio Casualty's motion for
summary judgment below for all the reasons stated in Point I,
Parts A and B of its Respondent's Brief.
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Even the headings of

the arguments are identical.

See Memorandum in Opposition to

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Table of Contents.
However, the related activity argument was not raised in any
other memoranda submitted by Shelter America nor was it raised
in oral argument.

Shelter America's failure to raise this

argument below precludes this Court's consideration of it for
the first time on appeal.

See Berger v. Minnesota Mutual Life

Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 388 (Utah 1986); Villeneuve v. Schamanek,
639 P.2d 214 (Utah 1981) .
Further, even if this court considers Shelter America's
argument, the argument should be rejected.
involved motor vehicles or it did not.

The fraud either

Shelter America miscon-

strues Betenson v. Call Auto, 645 P.2d 684 (Utah 1982).
Betenson found that "coverage under the bond exists only for
activities constituting the conduct of the dealer's business
'as a dealer,' or for activities which the dealer has represented as part of his business 'as a dealer.'"
(emphasis added).

Id.

at 687

Hence, the activities must actually con-

stitute part of the dealer's motor vehicle business, not simply
be related to that business.

Under Shelter America's analysis,

Ohio Casualty would be liable if Dewey & Bob's had sold fake
diamonds from a counter at its place of business.

The rule

proposed by Shelter America unnecessarily blurs the line
between motor vehicle activities and other activities of the
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motor vehicle dealer.

The bond is only required and was only

written to cover the dealer's motor vehicle business.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons as well as those stated in Ohio
Casualty's initial brief, Ohio Casualty respectfully requests
that this Court reverse the ruling of the lower court and rule
that Ohio Casualty is not liable to Shelter America in any
amount.
DATED this Z>*

day of December, 1986.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

'M. Berry
Johrj/X. Lund
rrneys for Cross-Appellant/
Respondent Ohio Casualty and
Insurance Company
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